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 COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ADOPTIVE PARENTS’ EXPRESSION OF RACIAL
PREFERENCES IN THE ADOPTION PROCESS
Colin Schlueter*
The practice of transracial adoption, the adoption of a child who is not the same
race as the adoptive parents, has been the subject of much controversy and debate.1 
When considering the intersection of racial classifications or considerations and the
role they play in the adoption process, the primary disagreements appear to be, on one
hand, over what solution is the most appropriate with regard to public policy, and, on
the other, what solution is or is not constitutionally required.2  This debate becomes
all the more complicated when one considers the various impacts transracial adoption
has on the three big players in the adoption game; the State, the child, and the potential
adoptive parents.3
One of the murkiest, but perhaps most compelling, topics in the myriad of issues
surrounding the transracial adoption debate is the constitutional implications, in an
equal protection context, of the consideration of race in the adoption process.4  This
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1 See generally, R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’
Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE  L.J. 875, 877–78 (1998)
(“The role of race in adoption has been an intensely and widely debated topic . . . attracting the
attention of legal scholars, social scientists, journalists, and politicians.”).
2 See David D. Meyer, Lecture, Palmore Comes of Age: The Place of Race in the
Placement of Children, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 183, 186 (2007) (noting the “contending
understandings of the legal constraints on considering race in the matter of child welfare . . . .”);
see also Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests
of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925 (1994) (reviewing how courts have
differed in their determination of what is constitutionally permissible with respect to the con-
sideration of race in custody or adoption proceedings and detailing policy arguments for and
against transracial adoption).
3 See Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1415, 1454–58 (2006) (discussing the perceived and actual barriers to adoptive parents
when considering transracial adoption); Meyer, supra note 2, at 184–85, 189 (noting the con-
flict between the law, the best interest of the child, and the child-welfare system); see also
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH &
LEE L. REV. 203, 247–50 (2009) (describing the interaction of entities in the “adoption market”
and some of the various interests of “Baby Market Intermediaries,” adoption agencies, and
potential adoptive parents).
4 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1243 (1991) (“It should be clear that the
263
264 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:263
Note neither seeks to clear nor further muddy these waters, but instead examines a
segment of the long-running discourse on the intersection of race and adoption that
seems to have gone relatively unaddressed.  Although legal scholarship has paid a
great deal of attention to adoption agencies when addressing the equal protection con-
cerns implicated when state run adoption agencies or child welfare services consider
race in the adoption or child custody process,5 the constitutionality of adoptive parents’
ability to exercise a racial preference when adopting a child has gone relatively un-
examined and unquestioned.6
What should be done, either from a public policy or best interest of the child stand-
point, when considering potential adoptive parents’ assertion of racial preferences in
the adoption process, is not a novel topic of discussion.7  The possible constitutional
restrictions on this “demand” side8 of the adoption equation, however, remains fairly
neglected.  This Note is not concerned with which one of the many prescriptive recom-
mendations that scholars have offered with respect to transracial adoption is the cor-
rect one.  It is concerned with what must be done under the Constitution.
As such, this Note will examine under what conditions potential adoptive parents
could be subject to the strictures of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause
when participating in the state run adoption process.9  It will develop the argument that,
powerful preference for same-race placement embodied in many of today’s [adoption] policies
violates guarantees against discrimination contained in . . . the Constitution.”); Meyer, supra
note 2, at 185–86 (noting the “murkiness of the legal landscape” with respect to the extent to
which the courts may consider race when making child custody decisions).
5 See, e.g., Davidson M. Pattiz, Note, Racial Preferences in Adoption: An Equal Protection
Challenge, 82 GEO. L.J. 2571, 2574 (1994) (positing that a de facto ban on transracial adoption
in race-based adoption statutes “do[es] not satisfy the Constitution’s equal protection mandate”);
Mark C. Rahdert, Transracial Adoption—A Constitutional Perspective, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1687
(1995) (arguing that, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the use of racial criteria in the adoption setting is subject
to strict scrutiny).
6 Scholarly literature has paid little attention to the legality of potential adoptive parents
asserting racial preferences in the adoption process since Professor Banks’s 1998 response The
Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences, supra note 1, to Elizabeth
Bartholet’s Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption,
supra note 4, in which Banks proposed his scheme of “strict nonaccommodation” on the part
of adoption of agencies when considering the racial preferences of adoptive parents, but stated
that this policy was not “constitutionally required, but . . . constitutionally permitted.” Banks,
supra note 1, at 940; see also Maldonado, supra note 3, at 1470 (“Although there is a vast liter-
ature condemning race-matching practices, only recently have scholars begun to view adoptive
parents’ racial preferences as problematic.”).
7 See infra note 13 and accompanying text (comparing arguments on transracial adoptions).
8 Cf. Krawiec, supra note 3, at 205–07 (discussing the idea of “baby market[s]” and
“supply [and] . . . demand” in these markets).
9 This Note is only concerned with adoptions that are facilitated directly by a governmental
agency, such as a state department of child or human services, as opposed to adoption organi-
zations that do not receive governmental support, outside of licensure or regulatory oversight.
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by way of the “state action” doctrine,10 potential adoptive parents’ assertion of racial
preference in the adoption process could, and should, be subject to “strict scrutiny”11
upon a challenge from a potential adoptive child under the Equal Protection Clause.12
Part I briefly discusses the debate, both from a public policy and legal standpoint,
surrounding transracial adoption, and outlines the current state of the law with respect
to the consideration of the race of the child or potential adoptive parents in child cus-
tody proceedings and the adoption process.  Part II develops a hypothetical plaintiff—
an adoptive child—and discusses the potential success of an equal protection claim by
this child against prospective adoptive parents who have asserted a racial preference
when engaging in a state facilitated adoption process.  After concluding that this claim
could be successful, Part III discusses a potential remedy a court might utilize to ensure
equal protection for children in the adoption system, and the potential administrative
and social ramifications of this remedy.
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DEBATE OVER TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION
A. The Issues
The debate over transracial adoption seems to revolve around two, oftentimes
conflicting, considerations; what is the best public policy with regards to outcomes for
adoptive children and what is legally required with respect to the adoption process?13
See Krawiec, supra note 3, at 248 (stating that the “majority of international adoptions in the
United States are carried out through licensed agencies . . . .”).
10 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 507
(3d ed. 2006).
11 See, e.g., id. at 690.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”).
13 Compare Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA) of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-382, §§ 551–54, 108 Stat. 4056, 4056–57 (1994) (“An agency, or entity, that re-
ceives Federal assistance and is involved in adoption or foster care placements may not . . .
(B) delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, or otherwise dis-
criminate in making a placement decision, solely on the basis of the race, color, or national
origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved.” (emphasis added)); Elizabeth
Bartholet, Commentary, Cultural Stereotypes Can and Do Die: It’s Time to Move on With
Transracial Adoption, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 315, 316 (2006) (explaining how the
Inter-Ethnic Adoption Provisions of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§ 671(a)(18) (1996), amended MEPA by removing the “permissible consideration” language
which allowed adoption agencies to consider the cultural, ethnic, or racial background of an
adoptive child, and the ability of adoptive parents to meet the needs cultural of the child, in deter-
mining whether a child should be placed transracially), and Meyer, supra note 2, at 191–92
(describing the 1996 amendments “tightening MEPA”), with Andrew Morrison, Transracial
Adoption: The Pros and Cons and the Parents’ Perspective, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J.
167, 181–91 (2004) (outlining the various arguments in opposition to transracial adoption,
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1. The Policy Arguments
Historically, transracial adoptions were not considered and were often prohibited
by statute.14  As legal prohibitions on transracial adoption eroded under the scrutiny
of equal protection cases in the 1960s and 1970s, the adoption of Black children by
White families began to rise and eventually peaked in 1971.15
In response to this increase in the adoption of Black children by White families,
the National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) issued a position paper
trumpeting the evils of transracial adoption.16  The effect of the NABSW’s position
was to cause adoption agencies, both state and private, to turn towards race-matching,
the process of placing adoptive children with parents of their own race.17  As a result,
the number of transracial adoptions in the United States dwindled from its peak of
2,574 in 197118 to 1,076 such adoptions in 1976.19
This accommodation of the NABSW’s position against transracial adoption has
resulted in a seemingly limitless back and forth between the representatives of many
fields, both academic and professional, regarding the possible harms or benefits of
transracial adoption, both to the adoptive children and minority populations as a
group.20  One need only to perform an Internet or database search for articles on
particularly the adoption of Black children by White families, and noting that these arguments
include assertions that transracial adoption is detrimental to Black children who are adopted into
White families and that transracial adoption is damaging to the Black community as a whole).
14 Michelle M. Mini, Note, Breaking Down the Barriers to Transracial Adoptions: Can
the Multiethnic Placement Act Meet This Challenge?, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 905 (1994)
(citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422 (1965) (allowing only for the adoption of children of one’s
own race); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46a (Vernon 1959) (forbidding the adoption of
Black children by White persons and the adoption of White children by Black persons)).
15 See id. at 905–06 (citing Bartholet, supra note 4, at 1180).
16 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 2, at 926–27 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Black Social
Workers, Preserving African-American Families, Position Paper (1973)). The NABSW paper
was most concerned about the development of racial identity for Black children placed in White
homes, particularly in a racially divided society. Id.
17 See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 1186–88 (describing race-matching; a process by which,
in simplified terms, adoption agencies sort children and potential adoptive parents into groups
based on race and ethnicity and then match potential adoptive children to adoptive parents
based on racial or ethnic similarities between the two parties).
18 See id. at 1180 (citing R. SIMON & H. ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 29–30, 32
(1977)).
19 See Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leòn & Carla Bradley, Race and Transracial Adoption: The
Answer is Neither Simply Black or White nor Right or Wrong, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1227,
1239 (2002) (citing Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Transracial Adoption (TRA): Old Prejudices and
Discrimination Float Under A New Halo, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 409, 441 (1997)).
20 Compare Bartholet, supra note 13 (applauding the recent enforcement of laws aimed
at removing the consideration of race from adoption considerations) with Ezra E. H. Griffith
& Rachel L. Bergeron, Cultural Stereotypes Die Hard: The Case of Transracial Adoption,
34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 303 (2006) (citing recent positions issued by NABSW, the
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transracial adoption in order to be bombarded with opinions on every aspect of and
from every side of the transracial adoption debate; some unequivocally supporting
transracial adoption as a solution for combating the large number of Black children
in the child welfare system as well as the larger scheme of racial animus, and others
stating that such adoptions are only “symbolic” with respect to improved racial under-
standings or relations and are in fact detrimental to, or at least not sufficiently bene-
ficial to, minority children and minority groups as a whole.21  The present general
belief, however, appears to be that being adopted by “good parents” of another race
is preferable, at least from the child’s standpoint, to being adopted by “unqualified”
same-race parents or remaining in the foster system.22
Additionally, strong empirical evidence from long-term studies shows that
transracial adoption can be a positive, beneficial, and successful situation for many
adoptees.23  On a micro, individualistic level, transracial adoption has worked and
Child Welfare League, and the National Association of Social Workers in opposition to MEPA
and its amendments and expressing support for the consideration of race in adoptive place-
ments) and Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse
and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 33, 105–08 (1994) (“Like school
desegregation, transracial adoption poses risks to Black children and Black Communities. The
emphasis on placing Black children in white homes raises the concern that less emphasis is
being placed on strengthening Black homes. Despite the symbolic significance of transracial
adoption, . . . [it] will never provide a solution to the many problems that the vast majority of
Black children face in this society.”).
21 Id.
22 James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making
About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 896 (2003). But see Kathleen L.
Whitten, Permanent Families for African-American Foster Children in an Imperfect World,
12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 490, 494–96 (2005) (“[M]ost empirical studies cannot conclusively
assess the adequacy of transracial adoptions due to their methodological shortcomings.”).
23 See, e.g., RITA J. SIMON & RHONDA M. ROORDA, IN THEIR OWN VOICES: TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTEES TELL THEIR STORIES 382, 392 (2000) (describing the authors’ interviews with
twenty-four transracial adoptees and stating that “the [adoptees interviewed] believe[d] they
benefitted by having been adopted . . . . [and] that transracial adoption served them well . . . .”);
see also RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, ADOPTION, RACE & IDENTITY: FROM INFANCY
TO YOUNG ADULTHOOD 221–23 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the findings of Simon and Altstein’s
1972 to 1991 study of transracial adoptees and their adoptive families and concluding that race
was not a salient characteristic when it came to problems with adolescent alcohol or drug use,
or running away). The study also found that transracially adopted children, in both adolescence
and young adulthood, were “aware of and comfortable with their racial identit[ies],” that trans-
racial adoptees felt “as much a part of their families” as the birth children of those families, and
that there was no difference in the self-esteem or “familial integration” of transracial adoptees
and birth children in the same family. Id. at 222–23. But see SANDRA PATTON, BIRTHMARKS:
TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 169 (2000) (describing the results of
her “interdisciplinary ethnographic study” of transracial adoptees and stating that “the
development of a meaningful sense of racial identity is profoundly complex and problematic
for African American and multiracial adoptees raised in White families”).
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produced outcomes that are, overall, positive for both the adoptive family and the
adoptee.24  In total, “studies overwhelmingly show that children do very well raised
in multiracial families,” and that such placements, when compared with their same
race counterparts, do not show appreciable discrepancies in the areas of stability and
attachment.25  The simple, but powerful, conclusion one can draw from these findings
is that transracial adoption can be in the best interest of an adoptee.26
2. The Law
Although the “law” with respect to the consideration of race in the adoption pro-
cess, and the closely related area of making child custody determinations, presents
incongruous interpretations of what the Constitution permits or requires, it does in-
form, in concert with other constitutional doctrine, one as to the possible standards
and methods of analyses the Supreme Court might use if confronted with a case such
as the one proposed below.27
a. The Statute: The Multiethnic Placement Act
Congress passed the Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act28
(MEPA) in 1994, and brought the widespread practice of race-matching in adoptions
to national attention.29  The goal of MEPA was to reduce delays in the placement of
children in the adoption system due to race and to “facilitate the adoption of minority
children.”30  MEPA, as it existed when it first passed, stated that:
24 See SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 23, at 221–23.
25 See Meyer, supra note 2, at 202 (discussing the empirical research regarding the outcomes
of transracial adoptees) (citing SIMON & ROORDA, supra note 23, at 13–25; SIMON & ALTSTEIN,
supra note 23, at 10 tbl.1.5; Arnold R. Silverman, Outcomes of Transracial Adoption, FUTURE
OF CHILD., Spring 1993, at 104, 117 (1993); Whitten, supra note 22, at 495–97).
26 Whether a given action has been in the “best interest” of a child, a term which is inher-
ently vague and open to broad interoperation, is difficult to pin down because such a determi-
nation requires either predictions about future outcomes, or the ex post proof of a negative,
what the outcome would have been had a given action not been taken. As such, the “best
interest” of the child is used in this context to mean a “positive” or “satisfactory” outcome.
Such an outcome cannot be defined by set criteria or certain indicators, but, for the purposes
of this Note, is simply defined as the absence of what could be characterized as a negative
outcome. See Meyer, supra note 2, at 200 (noting the “amorphous” character of the concept
of a child’s “best interests”).
27 See Meyer, supra note 2, at 185–87 (explaining the “contending understandings of the
legal constraints on considering race in matters of child welfare and suggest[ing] that both
are wrong”).
28 Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 551, 108 Stat. 4056 (1994).
29 Transracial Adoption—Congress Forbids Use of Race as a Factor in Adoptive Place-
ments Decisions.—Small Business Jobs Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808 (1996),
110 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1354 (1997).
30 Id. at 1355 (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-279, at 5 (1996)).
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An agency, or entity, that receives Federal assistance and is in-
volved in adoption or foster care placements may not—[] categor-
ically deny to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive
or a foster parent, solely on the basis of the race, color, or national
origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved; or
[ ] delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into
foster care, or otherwise discriminate in making a placement deci-
sion, solely on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the
adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved.31
When initially passed, MEPA also contained a provision which permitted adoption
agencies to take the “cultural, ethnic, or racial background of the [adoptive] child” into
account as “one of a number of factors” when making a placement decision in order
“to determine the best interests of the child.”32
Two years later, Congress amended MEPA through section 1808 of the Small
Jobs Protection Act of 1996, entitled “Removal of Barriers to Interethnic Adoption.”33 
The effect of this amendment was to remove the portion of MEPA’s original language
which permitted adoption agencies, when making placement decisions, to consider
race under certain circumstances,34 thus “confirm[ing] that the appropriate standard for
evaluating the use of race, color, or national origin in adoption and foster care place-
ments is one of strict scrutiny.”35  The Department of Health and Human Services’s
(DHHS), the government agency tasked with enforcing MEPA, guidance letter on the
MEPA amendments went on to state that “[the strict scrutiny] standard is reflected in
the provision establishing that a violation of MEPA is deemed a violation of Title VI
[which] incorporates the strict scrutiny standard.”36  As such, the DHHS guidance
stated, “the Interethnic Adoption Provisions and the U.S. Constitution forbid decision
making [in the adoption process] on the basis of race or ethnicity except in the very
limited circumstances where such a consideration would be necessary to achieve a
compelling governmental interest,” and that “[t]he only compelling governmental
interest related to child welfare that has been recognized by courts is protecting the
31 Multiethnic Placement Act § 553(a)(1)(A)–(B).
32 See id. § 553(a)(2); Bartholet, supra note 13, at 316 (discussing MEPA’s “permissible
consideration” language).
33 See Meyer, supra note 2, at 191 n.47.
34 See Bartholet, supra note 13, at 316.
35 Memorandum from Dennis Hayashi, Dir., Office of Civil Rights (OCR), and Olivia
Golden, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Admin. for Children and Families (ACF), to OCR
Reg’l Managers and ACF Reg. Dirs. (June 4, 1997) [hereinafter DHHS Guidance] (emphasis
added), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/resources/specialtopics/adoption/
jointguidancewacf.html (discussing the “Interethnic Adoption Provisions of the Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996”).
36 DHHS Guidance, supra note 35; see Bartholet, supra note 13, at 317.
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‘best interests’ of the child who is to be placed.”37  With this interest in mind, DHHS
went on to state that “the consideration [of race or ethnicity in the adoption process]
must be narrowly tailored to advance the [adoptive] child’s interests, and must be
made as an individualized determination for each child.”38  DHHS reiterated this im-
portant point later in its guidance letter, stating that, “[a]ny decision to consider the
use of race as a necessary element of a placement decision must be based on con-
cerns arising out of the circumstances of the individual case.”39
The recent enforcement of MEPA’s provisions has added legitimacy to this
strong language from DHHS.40  The first such enforcement came in 2003 and was
directed towards Hamilton County, Ohio’s Department of Job and Family Services.41 
First, DHHS’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) drafted a Letter of Findings stating that
Hamilton County and the state of Ohio had violated provisions of MEPA and Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.42  Subsequently, DHHS’s Administration for Children and
Families (ACF) issued a Penalty Letter levying a $1.8 million penalty against Hamilton
County and Ohio.43  In its penalty letter, DHHS confirmed that strict scrutiny is the
standard by which it evaluates whether the use of race in the adoption placement pro-
cess is permissible under MEPA, as well as Title VI, and admonished that child wel-
fare workers have very limited “discretion to consider race in the placement process.”44 
DHHS went on to find that MEPA proscribes the systematic consideration of race in
the normal course of adoption placements, transracial or otherwise, and the disparate
consideration of race in transracial as opposed to same-race adoption placements.45 
DHHS also took issue with programs that might influence a potential transracial
37 DHHS Guidance, supra note 35; accord Hawkins-Leòn & Bradley, supra note 19, at 1248
(quoting the DHHS guidance memo regarding the implementation of the MEPA amendments).
38 DHHS Guidance, supra note 35 (emphasis added); accord Hawkins-Leòn & Bradley,
supra note 19, at 1248 (quoting the DHHS guidance memo regarding the implementation of
the MEPA amendments).
39 See DHHS Guidance, supra note 35; accord Bartholet, supra note 13, at 316
(emphasis added).
40 See Bartholet, supra note 13, at 317 (“[T]he strict scrutiny standard . . . invokes a
standard known in the legal world as condemning as unconstitutional under the Federal
Constitution almost all race-conscious policies,” and that “DHHS . . . has finally moved
beyond the tough-sounding words that it issued providing interpretive guidance, to take
action—action in the form of decisions finding states in violation of [MEPA] and imposing
the financial penalties mandated by MEPA.”).
41 See id. at 317, 320 n.6 (citing Letter from Lisa Simeone, Reg’l Manager, OCR Region V,
to Suzanne Burke, Dir., Hamilton County Dep’t of Job and Family Servs., and Tom Hayes, Dir.,
Ohio Dep’t of Job and Family Servs. (Oct. 20, 2003), available at http://www.law.harvard
.edu/faculty/bartholet/HHS_OCR.pdf (Letter of Findings, Docket No. 05997026)).
42 See id. at 317.
43 See id. at 317–18 (citing Letter from Wade Horn, Assistant Sec’y, ACF, to Tom Hayes,
Dir. Ohio Dep’t of Job and Family Servs. (Oct. 23, 2003), available at http://www
.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bartholet/mepa_letterofnotification.doc (imposing a $1.8 million fine)).
44 See id. at 317.
45 See id. at 317–18.
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placement decision based on the ability of the prospective adoptive parents, and even
the community the child would be brought into, to meet the cultural needs, in terms
of cultural education and appropriate respect and appreciation, of an adoptive child
of a race different from their own.46
Additional enforcement of MEPA by DHHS came in 2005, when DHHS issued
a Letter of Findings to South Carolina’s Department of Social Services.47  DHHS con-
cluded that the state’s Department of Social Services had violated MEPA and Title VI.48 
Specifically at issue for DHHS, was South Carolina’s practice of treating prospective
parents’ racial preferences with greater deference than other preferences and the fact
that the agency essentially implemented a placement system based on racial classi-
fication by virtue of this elevating of prospective adoptive parents’ racial prefer-
ences.49  Again:
DHHS found illegal the agency’s practice of treating transracial
adoptions with greater scrutiny, faulting, for example, the inquiries
into prospective parents’ ability to adopt transracially, and ability
to nurture a child of a different race, as well as inquiries into the
racial makeup of such parents’ friends, neighborhoods, and avail-
able schools.50
Most interestingly, and in direct contrast with the lower court cases discussed
below,51 DHHS also found South Carolina’s consideration of race as a “tie-breaking”
factor when making placement decisions to be in violation of MEPA.52  In justifying
its findings, “DHHS . . . emphasized that strict scrutiny is the standard and that the law
forbids any regular consideration of race, allowing its consideration only on rare occa-
sions and even then only to the degree it can be demonstrated to be absolutely neces-
sary.”53  As a consequence ACF levied a $107,481 penalty against South Carolina.54
46 See id. at 318.
47 See id. (citing Letter from Roosevelt Freeman, Reg’l Manager, OCR Region IV, to Kim
Aydlette, State Dir., S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter OCR S.C. Letter
of Findings], available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/activities/examples/Adoption
%20Foster%20Care/0100438lof.pdf (Letter of Findings)).
48 See id. at 318, 320 n.7 (citing Letter from Wade Horn, Assistant Sec’y, ACF, to Kim
Aydlette, State Dir., S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (Feb. 24, 2006) [hereinafter ACF S.C. Penalty
Letter], available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bartholet/mepaSCsignedpenaltyletter
.pdf (Penalty Letter)).
49 See id. at 318–19.
50 Id. at 319.
51 See discussion infra Part I.A.2.b (discussing In re Marriage of Gambla, 852 N.E.2d
847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) and other relevant cases).
52 Bartholet, supra note 13, at 319 (citing OCR S.C. Letter of Findings, supra note 47;
ACF S.C. Penalty Letter, supra note 48).
53 Id. at 318.
54 Id. (citing OCR S.C. Letter of Findings, supra note 47; ACF S.C. Penalty Letter, supra
note 48).
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These “shot[s] across the bow[s]” of state adoption agencies send the clear mes-
sage that DHHS intends to stand by the rigidity of the guidance it has issued on the
interpretation of MEPA, and that the legal standard that adoption agencies must meet
when considering race in the adoption process is one of the highest scrutiny.55
b. The Cases
Although DHHS’s recent enforcement efforts clarify its intent with respect to the
enforcement of MEPA and the standard by which it will judge the use of race in the
adoption process,56 the constitutional landscape with respect to the consideration of
race in the adoption context remains somewhat muddled.57
A twenty-five year-old Supreme Court case, Palmore v. Sidoti, seems to be the
closest thing to a pronouncement from the Court as to how lower courts should deal
with the consideration of race in the adoption context.58  Palmore dealt with a custody
dispute between a divorced couple, one of whom was a White woman “cohabiting
with a Negro . . . .”59  The lower court heard testimony from both parties and found
that there were no issues as to the devotion of either parent to the child, adequacy of
either parent’s housing, or the respective new spouse of either parent.60  The trial court
went on to discuss, however, the “inevitable” negative social ramifications for the child
if she were placed in her mother’s biracial household and, with this consideration in
mind, proceeded to award custody to the father.61
On review, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court to “divest[ ] a natural
mother of the custody of her . . . child because of her remarriage to a person of a dif-
ferent race.”62  In strong language, and after noting that the “[s]tate . . . has a duty of the
highest order to protect the interests of minor children,” Chief Justice Burger wrote:
The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases and
the possible injury they might inflict are permissible consider-
ations for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural
55 Id. at 319.
56 Id.
57 See Meyer, supra note 2, at 185–86 (explaining that the enactment of MEPA, in the eyes
of “[o]bservers,” has not removed all the ambiguity from federal law with respect to the con-
sideration of race in adoption, and that “[r]ecently, new developments have only underscored
the murkiness of the legal landscape”).
58 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); see also Meyer, supra note 2, at 185 (“Palmore’s
intervention . . . plainly did not end the debate over whether race may be considered in matters
of custody and adoption. In the more than two decades since Palmore, courts . . . have con-
tinued to struggle . . . to define the appropriate role for race in the placement of children.”).
59 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 430.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 431 (quoting the findings of the trial court).
62 Id. at 430.
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mother.  We have little difficulty concluding that they are not.  The
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tol-
erate them.  Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but
the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.  ‘Public
officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a consti-
tutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private racial
prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply held.’63
The Court ultimately held that “[t]he effects of racial prejudice, however real,
cannot justify . . . removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother.”64 
Although the language in Palmore seemed to be clear enough with respect to its stance
on the consideration of race in child custody decisions by citing Strauder v. West
Virginia65 for the proposition that “[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to do away with governmentally imposed discrimination based on race,”66 some
lower courts have nonetheless adopted a questionably narrow reading of Palmore.67
Recently, in In re Marriage of Gambla,68 the Illinois Court of Appeals, relying on
Illinois precedent that pre-dated Palmore by more than twenty-five years,69 upheld the
decision of a trial court to place a biracial child with her Black mother because, after
finding the parents “equal” in other respects, the trial court permissibly
[N]oted that [the child] would have to learn to exist as a biracial
woman in a society that is sometimes hostile to such individuals
and that [her Black mother] would be better able to provide for [the
child’s] emotional needs in this respect, [and] believed that this
factor tipped the scale slightly in [the Black mother’s] favor . . . .70
The trial court’s determination had been to award the mother sole custody of the
child.71  The appellate court seemed to condone the blatant consideration of race in
custody decisions so long as the consideration of the race of the parents or of the child
did not outweigh the other relevant factors.72  In affirming the lower court’s ruling, the
appellate court believed it was following the precedent of Palmore and other lower
63 Id. at 433 (internal citations omitted).
64 Id. at 434.
65 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
66 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432.
67 See Meyer, supra note 2, at 186 (discussing the narrow reading of Palmore in In re
Marriage of Gambla, 853 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)).
68 853 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 810 (2007).
69 See id. at 868 (citing Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956)).
70 Id. at 868; accord Meyer, supra note 2, at 193.
71 Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 861 (emphasis added).
72 See Meyer, supra note 2, at 193.
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courts confronting similar situations, stating: “so long as race is not the sole consider-
ation for custody decisions, but only one of several factors, it is not an unconstitutional
consideration. The dissent grossly misinterprets the holding of Palmore and ignores
its progeny.”73
The dissent in Gambla read the trial court’s decision to award custody to the
biracial child’s Black mother because of her “slightly better ability to provide . . .
a breadth of cultural knowledge and experience to help [her daughter] learn to exist
as a biracial individual,” to mean that the trial court had based its custody decisions
“solely on the premise” of the race of the parents.74  The dissent believed that the trial
court’s actions in considering the race of the child and the mother as the tipping or de-
ciding factor in their custody decision were of the exact type precluded by Palmore. 
The dissent argued that, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has . . . specifically re-
jected the consideration of racial biases, or the effects of racial prejudice and classi-
fications, in child custody matters as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.”75  Considering that the facts of Palmore and Gambla are
not readily distinguishable,76 this appears to be a correct interpretation of the Court’s
language in Palmore.77
73 Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 869 (citing J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir. 1989)
(declining to read Palmore as “a broad proscription against the consideration of race in matters
of child custody”)); accord Meyer, supra note 2, at 193; see also Drummond v. Fulton County
Dep’t of Family & Children Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1204–06 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 910 (determining that use of race as merely one factor in making adoption
decisions is constitutional); Tallman v. Tabor, 859 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that
race can be considered in determining custody so long as race is not the sole consideration);
In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 621–29 (Pa. 1983) (holding that trial court should have con-
sidered race as a factor in making foster placement decision); Farmer v. Farmer, 439 N.Y.S.
2d 584, 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (stating that “the general rule appears to be that race is simply
one factor among many others which should be considered in determining what is in the
child’s best interest”).
74 Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 876; accord Meyer, supra note 2, at 193.
75 Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 876 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)) (internal
citation omitted).
76 See Meyer, supra note 2, at 193 (arguing that the actions of the respective trial courts in
question in both Palmore and Gambla were almost the exact same). Compare Palmore, 466
U.S. at 430 (stating that “the court made a finding that ‘there is no issue as to either party’s
devotion to the child, adequacy of housing facilities, or respectability of the new spouse of
either parent’” (internal citations omitted)) with Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 866 (stating that “the
trial court found the parties to be equally qualified to care for [the child]”).
77 See Meyer, supra note 2, at 193–94 (“[To the appellate court in Gambla, 853 N.E.2d
847,] the Illinois trial court’s use of race was unproblematic because race was certainly not the
only factor considered, it was just the only distinguishing factor. This understanding of Palmore
is almost certainly incorrect. As an initial matter, it is simply wrong to say that the Palmore trial
court had considered only race. . . . Nor, in any event, is there much analytic substance to the
distinction between using race as a ‘sole’ factor and using it to ‘tip scales’ that would otherwise
be balanced differently.”).
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B. Where Does the Standard Stand: Some Assumptions Going Forward
For the purposes of the discussion to follow, it is important to pinpoint a fairly
specific standard by which the Court would or should judge the consideration of race
in the context of adoption.  In order to guide this determination one might look to the
two ends of the spectrum described above,78 side with one or the other, or reject both.79
For the purposes of this Note, in keeping with what seems to be the Court’s lan-
guage in Palmore80 and DHHS’s enforcement of MEPA,81 the assumption will be that
the Court, upon review of the use of racial classifications in adoption placement deci-
sions, would apply strict scrutiny.  As such, any such action would need to be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest such as promoting the “best interest of the
child.”82  A more precise definition of this interest will be developed in a later section.
II. WHAT ABOUT THE PARENTS
For the majority of this discussion, little has been said regarding prospective
adoptive parents’ right to consider race in the adoption context.  The rest of this Note
will focus on this issue and consider how the existing law with respect to the consid-
eration of race in determining child custody and placement could affect the ability of
adoptive parents to assert their racial preferences in the adoption process.  As discussed
earlier, the possibility of legal constraints on a set of prospective adoptive parents’
ability to express racial preferences has not been seriously considered.83  In turn, the im-
plications of not being able to control this “demand” side of the adoption market raises
questions as to how effective even the strictest enforcement of the letter of MEPA can
78 See supra Parts I.A.2, I.A.2.b.
79 See Meyer, supra note 2, at 199 (“HHS’s rigid view of the legal strictures on race in child
placement could not be more different from the almost-anything-goes attitude exemplified
by the Illinois court’s decision in Gambla. Whereas Gambla was prepared to validate almost
any use of race as a factor in placement decisions, so long as it was not exclusive, HHS would
permit almost none.”).
80 But see id. at 200 (arguing that “Supreme Court precedent seems to refute the idea” that
a child’s “best interests” are a compelling state interest based on his reading of Palmore and
several other Court cases).
81 See id.
82 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“The State, of course, has a duty of
the highest order to protect the interests of minor children, . . . Florida law mandates that cus-
tody determinations be made in the best interests of the children involved. The goal of granting
custody based on the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial governmental
interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.” (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added)); DHHS Guidance, supra note 35; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 669–77
(discussing a framework for equal protection analysis); Meyer, supra note 2, at 195 (“[A]ll
race-conscious government decision making must be subjected to strict scrutiny. There is no
basis for placing race-based decisions in the context of adoption and custody as somehow
outside the scope of heightened constitutional review.”).
83 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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be in eradicating the consideration of race, unconstitutional or otherwise, from the
public adoption process.
This discussion will begin by formulating a “plaintiff” child and outlining their
equal protection claim.  In doing so, it will discuss how, through the “state action”
doctrine, potential adoptive parents could be subject to the same constitutional stric-
tures as other state actors when participating in the adoption process.84  Lastly, this
section will discuss a potential remedy the Court might employ, and the social and
administrative difficulties this might present.
A. The Infant
Black children account for 15 percent of the child population in the United States,
but they represent approximately 32 percent of the children in foster care.85  This fact
puts their numbers at approximately 163,000 children in foster care.86  Additionally,
Black children are less likely than children of other races to move to a permanent living
situation in a timely way and, along with Native American children, have lower rates
of adoption than children from other ethnic groups.87  Because most of the debate
surrounding transracial adoption centers on the adoption of Black children by White
families,88 the hypothetical infant in this scenario will be Black.  Additionally, in order
to simplify the analysis, this infant will be a newborn, have no apparent health prob-
lems, and be immediately available for adoption.  As such, he will meet all of the pref-
erences of our hypothetical adoptive parents except for their race preference.
B. The Parents
Although their race is not ultimately important to this analysis, the parents in this
scenario will be White, they will meet all the qualifications of the adoption agency
handling the adoption of the above-described child, and they will have just begun the
process of approval for a child and matching with an adoptive child.  Furthermore,
let us assume that these adoptive parents are in the process of going through an initial
interview process where they provide information to the adoption agency, both about
themselves and, as is often the case, about the type of child they wish to adopt.89
84 See supra Part I.B.
85 SUSAN SMITH ET AL., EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, FINDING FAMILIES
FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN: THE ROLE OF RACE & LAW IN ADOPTION FROM FOSTER
CARE 5 (2008).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See PAMELA A. QUIROZ, ADOPTION IN A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 42 (2007) (“‘[B]lack
children and white parents have always defined the debate about transracial adoption, achiev-
ing a symbolic importance . . . .’” (quoting ELLEN HERMAN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTIONS, THE
ADOPTION HISTORY PROJECT, (2007), http://www.uoregon.edu/~adoption/topics/transracial
adoption.htm)).
89 See, e.g., Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., Foster/Adoption Application for Parenting
(2009), available at http://www.state.tn.us/youth/adoption/FosterAdoptionApplicationfor
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C. The Discriminatory Action
Now comes the action that has received so little critique.  What happens when
potential adoptive parents walk into the adoption agency with a pre-determined image
of their new child; a new child that may be of a certain race or ethnicity.  The first
issue that needs to be addressed is how this image is translated into action and how
this action conveys the adoptive parents’ racial preference to the adoption agency.
During an initial interviewing or screening process, the adoptive parents’ expres-
sion of a race preference for their potential adoptive child can take place in one of two
ways; an adoption agency may allow them to state which babies, based on race, they
are willing to accept or which babies, based on race, they are not willing to accept.90
After this initial expression of a race preference, potential adoptive parents may
again be given the chance to express a racial preference.91  Even if they do not assert an
initial racial preference, adoptive parents have another chance to make an adoptive deci-
sion based on racial considerations when accepting or rejecting a potential adoptive
child.92  If the infant the adoption agency offers the parents does not meet their require-
ments or desires, perhaps because its race does not match their preferences, they may
reject it without consequences stemming from this rejection on the basis of race.
Let us assume that our adoptive parents and hypothetical adoptive child are
involved in this very situation.  The parents enter the adoption agency, and, because
they would prefer a White or Hispanic infant, note this in their initial interview with
the adoption official, overtly stating that they would prefer a White or Hispanic child
or that they are only willing the accept White or Hispanic children for adoption.93 
Assuming the adoption agency is familiar with DHHS’s recent enforcement of MEPA,
they may decide that, in light of the precedent set by this enforcement, that it is only
appropriate to offer our newly born Black infant to the couple, because the potential
adoptive parents and the Black infant are compatible in all other respects.  Let us even
ParentingCS-0411.pdf (presenting areas on their application for potential adoptive parents for
them to state their race and the race of the children they hope to adopt).
90 See Maldonado, supra note 3, at 1470 n.276 (“Most adoption agencies ask prospective
adoptive parents to select the race of the children they would consider adopting, and parents
can be quite specific when selecting the racial and ethnic breakdown of their child. . . . Some
public agencies have lists of available children classified by race.”); Bartholet, supra note 4, at
1186–87.
91 Maldonado, supra note 3, at 1471.
92 Id.
93 This expression of racial preference and the state’s facilitation of this preference was the
subject of Richard Banks’s article, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial
Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, in which he argued that the process by
which state adoption agencies solicit or take into account the racial preferences of adoptive
parents violates Equal Protection. Banks, supra note 1, at 899–914. Professor Banks’s article
focused on the actions of the adoption agency, while the argument at hand is concerned pri-
marily with the actions of parents, regardless of whether the adoption agency actively solicits
their racial preferences. See Maldonado, supra note 3, at 1470.
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assume that the adoption agency, in an effort to walk the line of compliance with
DHHS and Supreme Court precedent94 have installed some process by which they
determine that the transracial placement would be in the best interest of the child and
that the consideration of race in this adoption, with respect to this child and this
family, is not constitutionally permitted.  Regardless, however, the parents reject the
child because of his race, and, as a result, increase the amount of time he must spend
in foster care.95
The “harm” remaining in a situation without permanent parents poses to children
is a topic that warrants some discussion.96  Once placed in the foster care system,
either voluntarily or as a result of the termination of the biological parents’ parental
rights, the clock begins to tick.  The longer a child remains in the foster care system,
the more entrenched they become in the “hard-to-place” category of children.97  As a
child grows older and he or she accumulates damaging experiences in foster care,98 he
or she becomes a less desirable candidate to prospective adoptive parents,99 and the
chance of ever being adopted decreases.100
Some commentators have gone so far as to describe the consequences of “institu-
tionalization and successive foster care placements” as “ravaging.”101  Children who
do not have the benefit of a relationship with a person who fills the role of a parent, if
only psychologically, may develop a host of problems, including a decreased or non-
existent ability to “form deep emotional attachments or warm social relationships,” and
decreased intellectual function.102  As such, when faced with the options of remaining
in the foster care system or being placed in an adoptive family of a race other than that
of the child, the latter is by far the lesser of the two “evils.”103
94 See discussion supra Part I.A.2.a.
95 See Maldonado, supra note 3, at 1425–26 (finding that White Americans are five times
more likely to adopt a non-African-American child than an African-American one).
96 The intricacies of whether this “harm” is too speculative or attenuated to maintain a
justiciable claim is an issue that goes somewhat beyond the scope of this Note. All that is
important, however, is a tenable assumption that a child could, in theory, make the requisite
showing of “harm” or “injury” to have a justiciable claim. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10,
at 63 (discussing standing requirements).
97 See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 1204.
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See Hawkins-Leòn & Bradley, supra note 19, at 1265 (citing Amanda Spake, Judges
Push to Get Kids Into Stable Homes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 19, 1999, at 62–63;
Kristie Ann Rooney, Racial Matching vs. Transracial Adoption: An Overview of the
Transracial Adoption Debate, 53 J. MO. B. 32, 32 (1997)).
101 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 2, at 938 (citing Shari O’Brien, Race in Adoption
Proceedings: The Pernicious Factor, 21 TULSA L.J. 485, 492 (1986)).
102 Id.
103 See Silverman, supra note 25, at 115 (after reviewing studies regarding the outcomes
of transracial adoptees, describing the findings of researchers who found that, “the deleterious
consequences of delayed placement are far more serious than those of transracial placement,”
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Additionally, and aside from any present or future “harm” that a child may
experience due to increased time in the foster care system or an institution, adoption
could be viewed as a state provided privilege or benefit, one which children without
legal parents desire.  As such, the denial of an equal opportunity to partake of this
benefit, the equal opportunity to be adopted by any given set of parents, could also
be seen as “harm” to a potential adoptive child.104
D. The Claim
At this point, the potential adoptive parents have either made an overt expression
of racial preference regarding the type of child they wish to adopt, or rejected a child
that is offered to them on the sole basis of its race.  Their “demand side” preference105
has essentially nullified the adoption agency’s ability to work towards an adoption
process where each child has an equal chance of adoption regardless of their race.  The
question now becomes what recourse, if any, does our child have against these parents
who have rejected him solely on the basis of his skin color?
For this scenario, assume our child raises a claim, through a guardian ad litem, by
way of a § 1983 suit,106 alleging that the prospective adoptive parents have violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right to the equal protection of the law.107  The law in question
would be the applicable state statutes that authorize and regulate the adoption process.108
and that their findings implied that “when a choice must be made between transracial place-
ment and continued foster or institutional care, transracial placement is clearly the option more
conducive to the welfare of the child.”).
104 See Banks, supra note 1, at 900–01 (describing the harms of “facilitative accom-
modation” to include the denial of individualized consideration for each child, regardless of
race, and their exclusion from being considered as adoptive candidates for certain parents on
account of their race (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing “the Constitution’s focus upon the
individual”))); see also Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v.
City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (describing the injury of racial classification
as a “denial of equal treatment . . . not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) (describing the
evil of the affirmative action plan at issue as denying certain citizens “the opportunity to com-
pete for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race”); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 10, at 75–82 (discussing causation and redressability).
105 See Krawiec, supra note 3, at 247–50 (advancing the idea of a “baby market”).
106 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .”).
107 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
108 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.2-1200-1201 (2010) (statutes delineating who is eligible
to adopt a child, who may be placed for adoption, who may place a child for adoption, and
the method by which the adoption process takes place).
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1. The State Action Doctrine
The first issue that must be addressed, is by what mechanism can private indi-
viduals, the adoptive parents who are engaging in the adoption process, be subject
to the strictures of the Constitution, which only binds state actors?109
The “state action doctrine” allows the reach of the Constitution to extend to
situations in which the actions of private actors are of such a character that they can
reasonably be considered state actors.110
As the amorphous “state action doctrine” has developed, some scholars have found
it helpful to break the relevant cases into two overlapping groups, “Public Function
Exception” cases and the “Entanglement Exception” cases.111  The “Public Function”
cases generally deal with situations where a private entity, such as a corporation or pri-
vate group, has in some way supplanted the government in the performance of one or
more of its traditional roles, “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.”112 
The “Entanglement Exception” cases have wrestled with situations in which “the gov-
ernment affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates private conduct that vio-
lates the Constitution.”113
In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,114 the Court added substance to the “Entanglement
Exception” by laying out a two-part test for determining whether the action of private
individuals was of such a character, due to its facilitation by a public or governmental
authority, so as to subject it to the strictures of the Constitution.115  The Lugar court
stated that:
Our cases have . . . insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the
deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State. 
These cases reflect a two-part approach to this question of “fair
attribution.”  First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise
of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of con-
duct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is
responsible. . . .  Second, the party charged with the deprivation
must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.  This
may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together
109 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 507 (“The Constitution’s protections of
individual liberties and its requirement for equal protection apply only to the government.
Private conduct generally does not have to comply with the Constitution.”).
110 See, e.g., id.
111 See, e.g., id. at 518–19, 527 (describing “The Public Function Exception” and “The
Entanglement Exception” to the state action doctrine as the primary groups into which state
action cases can be grouped, but also noting the considerable overlap between the groups).
112 See id. at 518–19 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)).
113 Id. at 527.
114 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
115 Id.
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with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because
his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.  Without a limit
such as this, private parties could face constitutional litigation
whenever they seek to rely on some state rule governing their
interactions with the community surrounding them.116
The Lugar test carried forward, in perhaps a more concisely stated fashion, the
idea alluded to by the Court in Burton v. Willimington Parking Authority,117 the notion
that “state action” can be found in the conduct of private individuals where there is a
“symbiotic relationship” between the government and private actions.118  The Court
later applied the Lugar test to find “state action” in Georgia v. McCollum, and
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.119  In Edmonson, the Court found “state action”
in the use of peremptory challenges in civil litigation.120  The Court in Edmonson
seemed to more fully develop, or at least put a finer point on, the second prong of the
Lugar test, a point which was recognized in McCollum.121  The Court in McCollum,
relying on Lugar, and Edmonson’s more fully articulated version of the second prong
of the Lugar test, found “state action” in the use of peremptory challenges by criminal
defendants, because the privilege of peremptories is created by law and jury selection
is a government function that is made possible by the power of the state and the con-
trol of a judicial officer.122  The McCollum court remarked that:
[T]he Court in Edmonson found it useful to apply three prin-
ciples: (1) “the extent to which the actor relies on governmental
assistance and benefits”; (2) “whether the actor is performing a
traditional governmental function”; and (3) whether the injury
caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of govern-
mental authority.123
This further articulation of the Lugar test allows for a better-defined application
of the sometimes vague “state action” doctrine.
116 Id. at 937; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 530 (quoting Lugar , 457 U.S.
at 937).
117 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
118 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 532 (citations omitted).
119 See id. (citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)).
120 See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 627 (“The selection of jurors represents a unique govern-
mental function delegated to private litigants by the government and attributable to the gov-
ernment for purposes of invoking constitutional protections against discrimination by reason
of race.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 531.
121 See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 52; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 530.
122 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51–55.
123 Id. at 51 (citing Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621–22).
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a. Adoptive Parents’ Choice as State Action
Given the test for finding “state action” described in Lugar,124 it is possible to find
that adoptive parents’ participation in the state run adoption process is appropriately
considered “state action” and should be subject to constitutional control.  With respect
to the first prong of the Lugar test, it is readily apparent that adoptive parents, when
seeking to adopt through a state agency, are only able to engage in this process “by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State.”125  But for the state taking
the role of a willing actor in facilitating adoptions through its agencies, parents would
be forced to look elsewhere for adoption opportunities.126
As for the second prong of the Lugar test, framed by the considerations the Court
focused on in Edmonson,127 it is obvious that adoptive parents rely solely on the assis-
tance of the government when seeking to adopt a child through a state run agency. 
The state holds the power to confer the legal status of parentage and the attendant
rights that accompany this status.128  When choosing to adopt through a state agency,
the parents rely solely on the discretion and authority of the state adoption agency to
match them with potential children and ultimately place the children in their homes.129 
The “demand” side of the adoption relationship must prove to the “supply” side that
they are worthy of the “good” being supplied, and it is only through the acquiescence
and permission of the state that the “demand” will be satisfied.130  As such, the “govern-
mental assistance and benefits” described as being indicative of “state action” in Lugar
is readily apparent.
Whether potential adoptive parents are performing a “traditional governmental
function”131 depends on how one characterizes the function that adoptive parents are
performing.  The act of adopting can be characterized in one of two ways.  First, one
could view it as simply providing care to children who are not cared for by their bio-
logical parents.  When conceptualized in this manner, the state and the adoptive parents
play the same role and provide the same function as far as the child is concerned.  They
are simply the surrogate provider of care to a child who is no longer cared for by their
biological parents.
124 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
125 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
126 See generally Dwyer, supra note 22, at 884 (noting adoptions facilitated privately be-
tween biological parents and adoptive parents and adoptions through private adoption agencies
as alternatives to adoptions through state run agencies).
127 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
128 See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 22, at 858–59 (laying out a general synopsis of the state’s
power to confer legal maternity and paternity status, and facilitate adoptions).
129 See, e.g., id. at 884–89 (briefly describing the typical home study process that takes place
before the state will place a child in an adoptive home and outlining the multitude of factors
a state agency may consider when deciding whether to place a child with potential adoptive
parents).
130 See id.; see also Krawiec, supra note 3, at 247–50 (discussing the “baby market”).
131 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 52 (1992).
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Adoption could also be characterized as a process in which the State serves as
an intermediary, never intending to be the permanent receptacle for children who have
no legal parents, but facilitating the movement of children to permanent homes with
the attendant establishment of a new set of legal parents.132  In this regard, the State’s
function, in terms of the service they provide to the parentless child, could be catego-
rized as distinct from the function of the final adoptive parents, who assume the legal
parental rights to the child, and, presumably, do not plan to voluntarily relinquish these
rights or pass them on to someone else at a later point.
Which interpretation of the functions the State and the adoptive parents play in the
provision of care for parentless children is unclear.  As such, the Court would likely
choose whichever interpretation best suits its final determination with respect to the
“state action” question.
With respect to the final principle articulated by the Court in McCollum, “whether
the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental
authority,”133 it is difficult to say that the state involvement somehow aggravates the
injury, since there would likely be no injury but for the involvement of the State.  One
could hypothesize that, without state run adoption agencies or even any state regula-
tion of adoptions, private actors would step in to facilitate the entire adoption “market”
and could, in theory, freely consider race in their child-placement decisions.  In such
a world, the injury to children who are passed over for adoption due to the racial pref-
erences of adoptive parents would likely be as great as it would under the present cir-
cumstances where potential parents are allowed to engage in the same behavior.  As
such, the State’s involvement in the adoption process likely does nothing in and of
itself to increase the harm to parentless children resulting from being passed over by
potential adoptive parents on the basis of their race.
In total, however, it appears that the “symbiotic relationship”134 between the state
adoption agency and potential adoptive parents is of a sufficient character that the Court
could find that the actions of the private actors engaging in the adoption process con-
stitute “state action” and must comply with the strictures of the Constitution.
2. Equal Protection and the Application of Strict Scrutiny
Having found the requisite “state action,”135 we must turn to whether our adoptive
child, who our parents have passed over due to his race, has endured a violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment right to the equal protection of the law.136
132 See Krawiec, supra note 3, at 207 (describing “Baby Market Intermediaries” as those
entities that facilitate the “baby market,” and serve as a go between for the “suppliers” to the
“baby market” and those who wish to adopt a child).
133 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51 (1992).
134 See Krawiec, supra note 3, at 207.
135 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 507.
136 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive . . . any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
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a. The Expression of an Initial Racial Preference
Once “state action” has been found in the act of private individuals engaging in
the state facilitated adoption process, the parents themselves, as opposed to the adop-
tion agency, categorically excluding certain children from consideration as potential
adoptees by stating racial preferences to adoption agency workers becomes likely un-
constitutional.137  The action of categorically refusing to consider the adoption of cer-
tain children based solely on their race violates the Equal Protection Clause in almost
exactly the same way that “Facilitative Accommodation” does.138  In other words,
Professor Banks’s proposal of “Strict Nonaccommodation,” under which both adop-
tion agencies and adoptive parents would be prohibited from categorically excluding
children from consideration for adoption based on race,139 would be constitutionally
required.  Adoptive parents would be prohibited from expressing an overt racial pref-
erence with respect to potential adoptive children unless of course the adoptive parents
can meet the requirements of strict scrutiny.
b. The Rejection of a Potential Child Based on Race
As discussed above,140 there is a second point at which potential adoptive parents
may unconstitutionally deny a child the opportunity to be adopted due to his race. 
Regardless of whether the adoptive parents express any overt racial preference during
their initial interactions with the adoption agency, they may nonetheless reject a child
because of his or her race when the child is presented to them as a potential candidate
for adoption.141  In such a case, the expression of a racial preference is covert and harder
to detect, but no less constitutionally impermissible.142
The first step then is to prove a discriminatory purpose in the actions of the adop-
tive parents when they choose not to adopt a child that is offered to them.143  Making
this showing is perhaps the largest hurdle the child must meet when trying to create
a credible Equal Protection claim because it will be the rare occasion when a set of
137 See Banks, supra note 1, at  881 (arguing that “facilitative accommodation,” the process
by which adoption agencies categorically deny potential adoptive children the opportunity to
be individually considered for adoption based on the overt and asserted racial preferences of
the adoptive parents, violates the Equal Protection Clause).
138 Id.
139 See id., at 941–45.
140 See supra Part II.C.
141 See Banks, supra note 1, at 893–95 & n.73 (citations omitted).
142 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 710 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), for the proposition that “laws that are facially neutral as to race and
national origin will receive more than rational basis review only if there is proof of a
discriminatory purpose.”).
143 See id.
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potential adoptive parents will admit that their reason for rejecting a potential adoptee
was his or her race.
As such, it may be appropriate for the Court to adopt a procedure to facilitate the
rooting out of potential discriminatory intent. The approach it has adopted for testing
for racial discrimination in to use of preemptory challenges could serve as an instruc-
tive model.
In Batson v. Kentucky144 the Court set out a process by which a court can review
a party’s use of preemptory challenges in criminal trials to determine if there has been
“impermissible discrimination” in the striking of jurors.145  A defendant can challenge
the striking of jurors on Equal Protection grounds if he can make a sufficient show-
ing that the race of the struck juror motivated a prosecutor’s use of a preemptory chal-
lenge.146  If a party can make a showing sufficient to allow a judge to “draw an
inference that discrimination [in the making of the challenge] has occurred,”147 then
he has made a prima facie showing of impermissible discrimination, a showing that
has a fairly low threshold,148 and the burden shifts to the challenged party to offer a
“clear and reasonably specific” explanation of a “legitimate” basis for the challenge.149 
The judge must then decide whether this explanation is sufficient to overcome the
“inference” established at the first step.150  Although the effectiveness of Batson in
practice has received serious question,151 it is possible to modify the Batson procedure
to apply to claims of racial discrimination in the adoption process.152
Quite simply, should a set of potential adoptive parents choose to reject a given
child, the adoption agency could, just as a defense attorney might, use their judgment
to decide whether to challenge the parents’ choice as a potential equal protection vio-
lation.  If the adoption agency or an appointed guardian ad litem believes that a set
of parents has rejected a child because of their race, they could challenge this poten-
tially discriminatory action on behalf of the child.  The procedure could operate much
144 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
145 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 710–21 (discussing facially neutral
laws with discriminatory impact or administration).
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 See id. at 719 (stating that the Court’s decision to reverse in Johnson v. California, 543
U.S. 499 (2005), reinforced its intent to set a “low threshold” for producing evidence to raise
the necessary “inference” under Batson).
149 See id. (outlining the application and subsequent refinement of the Court’s holding
in Batson).
150 See id.
151 See Mimi Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 95, 104
(2008) (“The Batson scheme has been criticized since its inception. Courts, litigants, and com-
mentators have criticized it as difficult to implement and ineffective in protecting the rights
granted to litigants and jurors by Batson and its progeny. Many courts are frustrated with their
inability to second-guess the reasons behind an attorney’s race-neutral reason given at the
second step of the analysis . . . .”).
152 See id.
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in line with Batson, where a judge could decide if the weight of the evidence was
sufficient to raise an inference that the parents had refused to adopt a child because
of their race.  The court would then give the parents an opportunity to express their
race neutral justification for rejecting the child, and the judge could then determine
whether the justification was sufficient to overcome the inference of a violation of the
child’s equal protection rights.153
c. The Justification of the Racial Classification
Having established a possible infringement of the child’s Equal Protection rights,
the potential adoptive parents may be able to justify their racial classification if they
can meet the requirements of “strict scrutiny.”154  They must be able to “show an
extremely important reason for [their discriminatory] action and . . . must demonstrate
that the goal cannot be achieved through any less discriminatory alternative.”155
Under “strict scrutiny” in the equal protection context, the first question becomes
what, if any, “compelling” purpose can the state actor assert to justify their racial classi-
fication?156  The obvious choice in the case at hand is “the best interest of the child.”157
The first task is to pinpoint what defines this “amorphous” interest.158  Courts and
scholars have suggested that a “best interest of the child” standard sufficient to “rank
as ‘compelling’” for the purposes of equal protection, may lie at or between one of two
extremes, the avoidance of serious harm to the child and any perceptable gain for the
well-being of the child.159  What may be most appropriate, given the two extremes,
is to find some middle ground.  For example, the State’s compelling interest may lie
in seeing that a child has the opportunity to “flourish” or that decisions regarding the
child offer him or her a “substantial benefit.”160
With this understanding of the “best interest of the child” in place, it would be
incumbent on the adoptive parents to successfully show a court that their adopting
of a child of a given race would in some way be detrimental to the child’s ability to
153 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 718–19 (describing the mechanics of a Batson
challenge).
154 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 694 (“It now is clearly established that racial classi-
fications will be allowed only if the government can meet the heavy burden of demonstrating
that the discrimination is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.” (citing
DERRICK J. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 34–36 (1973))).
155 Id. at 694–95.
156 Id.
157 See supra note 82.
158 See Meyer, supra note 2, at 200 (describing the “best interests” standard as “too
amorphous.”).
159 See id. at 200–01.
160 Id. (citing Troxel v. Gainesville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), “which left the door open to state
intervention to preserve children’s important relationships with non-parents even in the absence
of proof that they would otherwise be harmed”).
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flourish.161  For example, they may be able to establish that the child would be re-
jected or ostracized by the community in which the adoptive parents live and that the
potential harm that could be caused by living in the community would be worse than
the harm caused by having the child remain in the foster care system.162
E. The Remedy
Should the potential adoptive parents not be able to meet their burden of show-
ing that their race based rejection of a potential child is justified by some substantial
harm that may come to the child should they adopt them, the court would then have
to fashion a remedy to redress the violation of the child’s equal protection rights.163 
Generally, redressability requires that there be a “substantial likelihood” that the re-
quested remedy would result in the complaining party receiving relief from the injury
that is complained of.164
In equal protection cases, however, the Court has modified its redressability juris-
prudence somewhat.165  If a plaintiff can articulate their claim in terms of being denied
the opportunity to compete or to be fairly considered for a certain benefit, the Court has
held that this denial is a violation of Equal Protection and a potentially redressable
injury in of itself, regardless of whether the remedy would actually secure the benefit
the plaintiff seeks.166  For example, in Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated
General Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, the Court found a violation of equal
protection where an “ordinance created a preference for minority businesses in receiv-
ing city contracts.”167  The Court stated that:
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult
for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for mem-
bers of another group, a member of the former group seeking to
challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained
161 Id.
162 But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 696–97 (describing the Supreme Court’s rejec-
tion of racial prejudice as a basis for child custody in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)).
163 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 75 (stating that in order to sustain a justiciable
claim, “[a] plaintiff also must allege and prove that the personal injury is . . . likely to be re-
dressed by the requested relief.” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 743 (1995))).
164 See generally id. (collecting cases and explaining that where the connection between the
injury claimed and the requested remedies’ ability to redress this injury is speculative or not
apparent from the record, the Court will likely dismiss the claim as non-justiciable).
165 Id.
166 See id. at 80 (“When a plaintiff alleges a denial of equal protection, the injury is the
denial of the ability to evenly compete. Even if ultimately the plaintiff would not receive the
benefit, a favorable court decision redresses the harm by providing equal opportunity.”).
167 Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993).
288 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:263
the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing.  The
“injury in fact” in an equal protection case of this variety is the
denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the
barrier not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.168
Additionally, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), the Court held that the university’s affirmative action program, which reserved
a specific number of admissions for minority students, violated Equal Protection.169 
Even though there was no guarantee that the plaintiff would be admitted to the univer-
sity in the absence of the affirmative action program, the Court found the injury at issue
to be the denial of the equal opportunity to compete for each admissions spot, regard-
less of whether the plaintiff obtained actual admission.170  The Court found that the
remedy of ruling the admissions program unconstitutional and enjoining the university
from utilizing it would redress this injury.171
A child who has been categorically excluded from consideration for adoption on
account of his or her race has suffered the type of injury the Court examined in Bakke
and Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America.  The potential
adoptive child has been denied the equal chance to compete for the opportunity to be
adopted solely because of his race, and this denial is a redressable injury.172  The simple
remedy that the Court could employ would be an injunction prohibiting potential
adoptive parents from expressing a racial preference when participating in the state run
adoption process and from rejecting potential adoptive children on the basis of their
race absent a compelling reason.173  Even though a child could never be forced on a
set of adoptive parents,174 potential adoptive parents who are found to be in violation
of such an injunction could be sanctioned accordingly.
F. Feasibility and Implications
The ultimate concerns of allowing a claim of this nature to go forward and actu-
ally result in a favorable resolution for a child, are the impact it might have on the
168 Id.
169 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 80.
170 Id. (discussing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 (1978)).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See discussion supra Part II.C.
174 See Banks, supra note 1, at 910–11 (“The Court has recognized two types of constitu-
tionally protected privacy interests relevant to the race-and-adoption issue: associational and
decisional interests. . . . The Court has repeatedly held as well that government action may
not unduly interfere with one’s right to associate with whomever one desires. Associational
interests prohibit not only laws that directly proscribe associational freedom, but also any law
that exerts a ‘deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate.’” (quoting NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 466 (1958))).
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participation of potential adoptive parents in the state run adoption process and the
detriment adoption agencies may suffer as a result of the attendant administrative
pressures.  It is entirely possible that when faced with having to put aside their racial
preferences when engaging in the state run adoption process, adoptive parents would
increasingly turn to private “intermediaries” when seeking to fulfill their adoption
needs.175  On a macro level, this would have the opposite of the intended effect.  A rul-
ing that could, in theory, increase the pool of potential adoptive parents for each in-
dividual child, could in fact decrease the overall pool of adoptive parents, a condition
that could nullify any benefits that might accrue to each child individually.176
Additionally, adoption agencies, which are not known as the bastions of adequate
staffing or funding,177 would be burdened with the task of trying to not only ensure that
their actions were in compliance with the Constitution, but also that each child is pro-
tected from the potentially unconstitutional actions of potential adoptive parents.  Such
a situation that would not only require additional resources, but would also place an
adversarial wedge in a relationship that should be more collaborative than combative.
With just these general and cursory considerations in mind, it is apparent that
a ruling in favor of the child in a case similar to the one outlined in this Note has the
potential to have detrimental consequences for most if not all of the players in the state
run “adoption market.”178  As such, it seems possible that the Court may try to get out
of hearing such a claim altogether, likely by letting it fall through the asymmetries
of the “state action doctrine.”179
CONCLUSION
The “supply” side of any market for a given good is only half of the equation, and
“demand” can be equally determinative of the final outcome in given market.180  In the
175 See Banks, supra note 1, at 956–57 (“Strict nonaccommodation may cause parents to
forego agency adoption rather than renounce their preferences. Those families who are only
willing to accept a child for adoption on the basis of race, but who are not financially able to
adopt through independent placement, might decide to forego adoption altogether. Many pro-
spective adoptive parents with economic resources would pursue independent or international
placements. Although black and white parents might resist strict nonaccommodation, white
parents would be more likely and able to adopt internationally or independently, whereas black
parents would be more likely to forego unrelated adoption altogether.”); Krawiec, supra note
3, at 204–05.
176 Banks, supra note 1, at 957 (“[P]roblems might result from parents’ decisions to forego
agency adoption. . . . fewer families might be available for those children in need of adoption.”).
But see id. at 957–58 (arguing that the circumstances under a system of strict nonaccommo-
dation may not result in a “net loss” of potential parents to Black children).
177 Id. at 897 (noting that public adoption agencies are usually “run by state child welfare
departments” and are “often heavily dependent on government funding”).
178 Id.
179 See supra Part II.D.1.
180 See Krawiec, supra note 3, at 247–50 (describing the interaction of entities in the
“adoption market”).
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“market” for adoptive children,181 both sides of the equation must be regulated if
public officials or legislators hope to achieve full control over the “adoption market”
and the expression of racial preferences in this market.182  Although MEPA assumedly
takes care of the “supply” side,183 meaningful restrictions on the expression of racial
preferences by potential adoptive parents do not presently exist.184  Subjecting adop-
tive parents to the strictures of the Constitution is one way by which this regulation
could be achieved without potentially unpopular legislation.185
Regardless of whether such an end would make good policy sense and many have
argued that it would,186 it is possible that this outcome is constitutionally required.
Through the “state action doctrine,” parents could be held accountable to potential
adoptive children for their expression of racial preferences and would have to meet the
rigors of “strict scrutiny.”  This could be a way towards an adoption process that only
considers race when absolutely necessary; a state of affairs where each child has the
equal opportunity at a chance for a permanent home.
181 Id.
182 Cf. Banks, supra note 1, at 941–51 (describing “strict nonaccommodation” as a control
on the ability of parents to express racial preferences in the adoption process as a counter point
to controlling an adoption agency’s ability to consider race in the same process).
183 See supra Part I.B.1.
184 See Banks, supra note 1, at 882 (“Yet not one legal analyst has argued that public
adoption agencies cannot (as matter of law) or should not (as a matter of policy) promote
adoptive parents’ racial preferences through facilitative accommodation.”).
185 Cf. id. at 955–58 (examining the potential political resistance to legislation that would
implement his policy of “strict nonaccommodation,” and a potential backlash by prospective
adoptive parents to such a policy).
186 See id. at 883.
